Surprise, the most vital element in airborne operations, was therefore lost before they even took off. Operation Market Garden was quite simply a very bad plan right from the start and right from the top.
Every other problem stemmed from that. Montgomery had not shown any interest in the practical problems surrounding airborne operations. He had not taken any time to study the often chaotic experiences of north Africa, Sicily and the drop on the Cotentin peninsula in Normandy.
Towering over everything was the fact that the operation depended on everything going right, when it is an unwritten rule of warfare that no plan survives contact with the enemy. This is doubly true of airborne operations.
The likelihood of the Germans blowing the road bridge at Nijmegen over the river Waal was barely discussed. Had they done so — and their failure to do so was an uncharacteristic mistake — XXX Corps could never have reached the First Airborne at Arnhem in time.
Flaws in the plan became more evident day by day, but Browning refused to advise Montgomery to reconsider the operation. On 12 September, Sosabowski heard that the number of gliders allocated to him had been reduced.
He would have to leave behind all his artillery while his anti-tank guns would be landed on the opposite side of the river to his main force. Two days later, he pointed out that the bridgehead to be held extended for 10 miles in difficult terrain. There was thus the possibility that his brigade might have to drop straight onto enemy-held ground.
And if the British failed to capture the bridge, the Poles would be left on the wrong side of the river. British brigade commanders were not nearly so critical, mainly because they could not face another cancellation. They just wanted to get on with it.
Brigadier General Jim Gavin of the 82nd Airborne was appalled that Urquhart should have accepted drop and landing zones so far from his main objective. Yet Gavin himself had been told by Browning that his first priority was to secure the Groesbeek heights south-east of Nijmegen. They overlooked the Reichswald, a great forest just across the German border, thought to conceal tanks.
Its great road-bridge thus slipped down to become a lower priority, partly because the First Allied Airborne Army refused to land coup de main glider parties. The SS Panzer Divisions Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg were indeed in the area, although with only three serviceable Panther tanks and fewer than 6, men between them. Yet they were still able to form a nucleus onto which other less experienced units could be grafted.
What the Allies failed to grasp was the extraordinary ability of the German military machine to react with speed and determination. Almost all the tanks that Allied troops faced in Market Garden were not present at the start of the operation, but were brought in from Germany on Blitztransport trains. Anyone with any experience of airborne operations could see that the British landing and dropping zones, up to eight miles to the west of Arnhem, were too far away to achieve surprise.
Major General Richard Gale, who had commanded the Sixth Airborne Division on D-Day, warned Browning that the lack of coup de main parties was likely to be disastrous and that he would have resigned rather than accept the plan. Browning refused to agree and asked Gale not to mention it to anyone else as it might damage morale.
There was little Urquhart could do about the other basic flaw. This meant that Urquhart had just a single brigade to secure his chief objective, and his division would be split in two with a wide gap in-between. Worse still, his signals officers were rightly worried that their radios might not work over that distance. Urquhart gave no hint in any of his reports, or in his book written after the war, that he opposed the plan, but then he was not a man to rock the boat or contradict the subsequent version of events that Arnhem had been a heroic, worthwhile gamble.
The fears of those who had grave doubts about Market Garden were soon realised. Out of the First Airborne Division, only a single battalion made it to the bridge at Arnhem and could hold no more than its northern approach. At Nijmegen, the 82nd Airborne lacked the strength to secure its flank on the German border and also seize the great bridge over the Waal until after the much-delayed Guards Armoured Division finally arrived.
By then the battalion at the Arnhem bridge had been crushed, and on 25 September, the battered remnants of the First Airborne at Oosterbeek had to evacuate to the south bank of the Lower Rhine. The Allied Forces advanced slowly. The ground forces had to drive north over a narrow two-lane road. On 20 September , despite heavy German resistance, the Allies managed to capture the bridges across the Waal in Nijmegen. This success came at a high price with countless soldiers paying with their lives during the heroic Waal crossing.
The Freedom Museum near Groesbeek is also a must-see when visiting Nijmegen. This is where the 82nd Airborne Division started its move on Nijmegen in September , and this area also witnessed the launch of Operation Veritable just a few months later in February. The museum brings all this past to life using the most advanced technology. Operation Market Garden was terminated on 25 September Sadly, the Allied Forces did not manage to capture the last bridge near Arnhem. They are honored every year on the first Sunday after 17 September.
It is now called the John Frost Bridge and is one of the most iconic audio stations on the Liberation Route. Listen to the hosts and hostesses at the Airborne at the Bridge visitor center, a branch of the Airborne Museum Hartenstein in Oosterbeek, as they recount the tragic events of September This annual Bridge to Liberation Experience is a spectacular multimedia commemorative event held on the bridge every year.
Discover this historic Liberation Route in Holland, that links up the most important milestones during the advance of the allies. When Holland was finally freed from Nazi occupation, it was in no small part thanks to Canadian troops. Bevrijdende Vleugels tells the terrible story of the liberation of southern Netherlands. The museum is situated in the area in which Allied Forces were dropped for Operation Market Garden on 17 September The war museum takes you on a trip through the history of the occupation, resistance and persecution during WWII and highlights the role of Overloon in Operation Market Garden.
Cross the unique bicycle bridge, literally cycling through the museum on your way to the nearby cemeteries. Experience the war and celebrate freedom at the new National Liberation Museum in Groesbeek.
Only a single battalion of the 1st Airborne fewer than men managed to reach the Arnhem bridge, while the Germans forced the rest into a pocket near the village of Oosterbeek, several miles away.
British paratroops of the 1st British Airborne Division in their aircraft during the flight to Arnhem. Due to limited numbers of transport aircraft, the British forces at Arnhem had to be dropped into the Netherlands over three days, rather than all at once, lessening the possibility of surprise as well as the impact of the attack. Allied parachute jumper landing almost headfirst during a daylight drop in the Netherlands, part of Operation Market Garden.
Dense fog in England on the second day of the operation, as well as thick, low clouds over the battleground in the Netherlands, hampered the transport of troops, as well as supplies. The supplies would have been crucial to the survival of British forces fighting to hold Arnhem Bridge. To make matters even worse, the wooded landscape and the separation between the different British battalions meant many of their radios stopped working. The 1st Airlanding Reconnaissance Squadron in position behind a tree covering a road near Wolfheze on September 18, during Operation Market Garden.
John Frost, had reached the north end of Arnhem bridge and fortified themselves within nearby homes, preparing to hold the bridge on their own until the arrival of relief ground troops. But the ground relief column, led by XXX Corps, had run into its own problems: The road toward Arnhem was narrow, only wide enough for two vehicles, and German infantry men wielding Panzerfaust anti-tank weapons picked off the nine lead British tanks right at the start of their advance.
Allied ground troops managed to advance only seven miles by the end of the first day. On the second day September 18 they covered 20 miles and caught up with U. Though they fought their way across the Waal by September 20, they were still eight long miles away from helping their desperate British comrades at Arnhem.
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